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Introduction
Few areas of federal oversight have been as inconsistently addressed
as those areas involving the regulation of broadcast and wire communication. All too often, action in this realm has been governed by political
rather than social or economic imperatives.' Many no doubt accept this
phenomenon as a necessary element of democratic decisionmaking.
Thus, the deregulatory fervor of the 1980s can be seen as part of a longterm process of political redefinition.
It may be that consistency and planning are not to be expected in an
industry regulated by politicians and political appointees. The uncoordinated policymaking bodies, however, like that of the federal deficit, present something of a political timebomb. The consequences of regulatory
neglect in this area will affect more than the traditional broadcast constituency of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The need for
a coherent national policy in this area becomes critical as traditional distinctions between communications technologies continue to blur, and the
information economy the technologies define expands. This Article
presents and evaluates a proposal to abolish both the FCC and the Na* Michael F. Starr is an attorney, broadcaster, and assistant professor teaching Broadcast Law and Policy at the Department of Communications, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois. Mr. Starr is co-author of a soon-to-be-published book, Electronic Media
Management (Focal Press, Boston). Mr. Starr served in the Federal Energy Administration as
a Ford Appointee in 1976-77.
** David J. Atkin (Ph.D., M.A., Michigan State; A.B., University of California, Berkeley) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Radio-Television at Southern Illinois University. His research interests include the effects of new technologies and telecommunications
policy. He has worked with local franchising authorities and public access groups in cable
television.
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1. E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
(3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION].
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tional Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in
favor of a Cabinet-level Department of Communications.

I
Background
When analyzing changes in communications policy, it is important
to reconsider the basis for FCC regulation of electronic media, particularly broadcasting.
A.

An Erosion of the Rationale

Spectrum scarcity, or scarcity-based rationales, and public interest
represent two of the major reasons for FCC involvement in U.S. broadcast regulation. In the late 1970s, however, courts recognized that
changes in technology severely undercut the scarcity-based rationales.2
The erosion of these rationales strikes at the core of the FCC's authority.3 The scarcity-based rationale for broadcast regulation stems from
the fact that during the development stages of the broadcast industry,
there simply was not enough allocable spectrum to accommodate all of
those persons and entities wishing to utilize the airwaves. 4 Consequently,
in 1943 the Court placed the authority to allocate the limited spectrum in
the hands of the FCC.5 Thereafter, it was the FCC's responsibility to
determine which applicants would be awarded spectrum space. Rather
than judge the specific merits of applicants vying for mutually exclusive
frequencies, the FCC chose instead to treat the spectrum as a public
good.6 Because there could be no assurance that one applicant's character would be superior to that of another, stations were to be licensed
2. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
3. The FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), was established to act
primarily as a "traffic cop" of the airwaves, supervising such matters as spectrum scarcity and
station interference.
After allowing the nascent radio industry to exist without regulation through the mid1920s, Congress was persuaded by broadcasters to provide some sort of regulatory structure.
A successor to the FRC, the FCC was originally chartered to continue to act as traffic cop in
the allocation of frequencies and to regulate the performance of incumbent broadcasters. The
FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (1988)).
4. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
5. Id.
6. Section 303 of the Communications Act defines the FCC's regulatory powers over
broadcasters. 47 U.S.C. § 303. Public good is a resource which is to be managed and developed for the benefit of the citizen who owns it. Radio and television licensees are "public
trustees" of that portion of the spectrum assigned to them. Under § 303(g) of the Communications Act, the FCC is charged with encouraging the "larger and more effective use of radio."
Id. at § 303(g).
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rather than owned, and each licensee would, therefore, be compelled to
operate in the public interest.
The erosion of the scarcity-based rationale began to occur in the late
1970s with the cable television industry's challenges to the right of access. 7 Earlier, the FCC's authority was extended to include cable television (CATV). This extension was based on the fact that CATV uses
microwave frequencies for distributing its programming. The broadening of the FCC's authority to include CATV was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as being "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's mission to
regulate broadcasting.' However, a series of FCC prohibitions placed on
cable programming, which were designed to protect broadcasters, were
vacated in Home Box Office v. FCC.9 Two years after HBO, the Supreme
Court, in Midwest Video v. FCC, o struck another blow in favor of cable
by vacating the FCC's rules requiring public access channels in larger
cable systems. " As noted by the Court, the absence of scarcity in the
increased number of channels removes the excuse for intrusion of access
in cable.12 Although scarcity was not central to its holding, this decision
laid the groundwork for subsequent challenges to scarcity applications
with the broadcasting industry during the 1980s. 13
7. See, e.g., Midwest Video v. FCC, 406 U.S. 689 (1979).
8. FCC authority to regulate cable was first recognized by the Court as "reasonably
ancillary" to its mission to regulate broadcasting in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
9. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977). The court found that rules limiting cable television's use of movies, sports, and regular
series programming in order to protect broadcasters were not reasonably ancillary to the
FCC's obligations to regulate broadcasting. Id at 27-28. In so ruling, the court was effectively
freeing cable to compete against broadcasters on a more even footing.
10. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). An earlier Supreme Court ruling
involving Midwest Video Corp. upheld the FCC's rules requiring larger cable systems to originate their own programming. See United States. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
Those rules were deemed consistent with the FCC's obligations to regulate off-air television.
Seven years later, the second Midwest decision marked the first time that the Court struck
down an FCC cable regulation. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 709 (interpreting 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h)).
11. Public access channels are offered by cable systems for subscriber use on a non-discriminatory, first-come, first-served basis.
12. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689. In this matter, the Appeals Court effectively elevated
cable to the status of broadcasting, in terms of constitutional protection. Midwest Video Corp.
v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). A further analogy to print media was not offered by
the Court. Six years earlier, the Court rejected a plea for mandatory forced access with broadcasters, on grounds that broadcasters were not common carriers. See Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
13. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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Opponents of the scarcity rationale point to the four-fold increase in
14
broadcast stations since 1974 as evidence of the rationale's mootness.
In fact, the Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters questioned the viability of the scarcity-based rationale in today's world, but
left that question to be answered by Congress and the FCC.' 5 Nevertheless, this trend opened the way for further FCC actions to allow the marketplace to decide such matters as station ownership.' 6 The FCC
formally disavowed scarcity-based rationales in 1985, suggesting that,
where possible, broadcasters should be given rights comparable to those
given to the print media. 17
Another rationale that previously upheld access and fairness rules
involved the public's right to access information. This argument stated
that the "government has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of
views reach the public."' 8 The Supreme Court rejected this argument as
it applied to print media access.' 9 It therefore seems that the access argument is not a sufficient justification for regulation unless it is coupled
with overriding scarcity concerns or other public interest concerns. Scarcity has presented a convenient technical pretext to promote an otherwise
socialistic end-governmental regulation which forces the sharing of
broadcast resources.
In response to these changes in the broadcast "playing field," broadcasters have intensified their demands for full constitutional protection.
As one trade group contends, "the free market acts to regulate the indus20
try as well as, and certainly more cheaply than, [the] government can."
Clearly, the demise of the scarcity rationale diminishes the present justification for the FCC's authority.
B.

A Jaundiced Status Quo

In addition to the decline of the scarcity rationale, emerging technology has created the need for a cohesive policymaking body. As this
section will show, the FCC has been anything but this, owing to its reactive nature. As one commentator suggests, the emergence of technolo14. Radio and Television News Directors Association, Annual Convention Program, Las
Vegas (1983).
15. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The Court implied that it
would be interested in seeing the FCC question the significance of scarcity as a regulatory
rationale. Id. at 376-77 n.11.
16. 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984).
17. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligation of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985)

[hereinafter 1985 FairnessReport].
18. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
19. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
20. Radio and Television News Directors Association, supra note 14.
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gies such as videocassette recorders, direct broadcast satellites,
microwave distribution, fiber optics, high definition television, videotext,
and hypermedia challenge today's status quo and offer opportunities for
a future increase in industry competition. 2 The FCC, however, is illequipped to meet these challenges, both by tradition and by structure.
Shortcomings in the FCC's decision-making ability have prompted the
D.C. Circuit to overturn numerous FCC rulings.2 2 As Trauth and
Huffman note, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly accused the FCC of failing to engage in reasoned action.2 3 Consequently, that court has held
against the FCC in twenty-two rulings between 1986 and 1988.24 It is
important to note that the FCC's inability to handle policymaking was
the incentive behind the creation of the White House Office of Telecommunications, now known as the NTIA. 25 The NTIA, however, has not
been integrated into the more powerful FCC. Consequently, this twopronged approach to communications regulation has not led to any improvements in telecommunications policymaking.
Presently, the NTIA is a discrete self-standing unit in the Department of Commerce, charged with long-term telecommunications policy
planning.2 6 Even if we were to assume that the NTIA fulfills its mission
to select proper policy, there is no coordination between it, the FCC, and
Congress. Absent this critically required coordination of efforts, an unworkable, trifurcated system of communications regulation still exists.
The NTIA is an in-house think tank without clout and without a
constituency.2 7 As an outsider to the regulatory mainstream, it can hope
to accomplish little on its own. The in-depth policy analysis of the NTIA
must be married to the day-to-day regulatory efforts of the FCC in a new
structure which not only creates policy, but implements it as well. The
past fifty-five years under the Communications Act of 1934 should have
taught us that we cannot regulate our way into a coherent communications policy.
21.

Paper by Michael Wirth, The Changing Structure of the Video Marketplace at the

Dawn of the 21st Century. Broadcast Education Association Annual Conference (April 1989).
22. See, e.g., supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.

23. Trauth & Huffman, A Case Study of a Difference in Perspectives: The DC Circuit Court
of Appeals and the FCC,J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Summer 1989, at 247-48.
24. Id.
25. NTIA Executive Order 12046 of March 26, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 24348 (1978).
26. The NTIA sought to correct leadership deficiencies in the 672-page book entitled
NTIA Telecom 2000, which attempts to project the future of broadcasting and telecommunications. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, NTIA TELECOM 2000: CHARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY (NTIA

Spec. Publication 88-21, 1988).
27. Starr, The Monday Memo, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 20.
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The coordination of efforts in the telecommunications area will be
crucial, in that information gathering and dissemination in the United
States will be to the 21st century what manufacturing was to the 20th
century.2 8 American telecommunications firms must compete against
subsidized foreign competitors in the race to develop information industries and develop the jobs that will necessarily follow. Absent a definitive
coordinated national effort, there is no way to insure continued international leadership or to resolve the conflicting and outdated regulation of
domestic broadcast media. Without changes in the national telecommunications policy, the United States remains a mere reactor to the dramatic changes occuring in the rest of the world. The United States needs
to set its own agenda and its own standards so that world changes will be
accommodating rather than accommodated.
A prime example of the absence of a definitive policy with international and domestic ramifications is the matter of High Definition Television (HDTV). HDTV is a technology that would increase the number of
scanning lines on a television receiver from the present 525-line standard
up to 1050 to 1125 lines. At present, over a dozen systems from other
countries are being tested for this high-resolution receiver which
promises to revolutionize the half-trillion dollar television set market in
the United States.2 9 By not articulating criteria for the reality of this
technological advance we may, by omission, arrive at a point where another nation's reality is forced upon us. As one commentator noted,
nothing less than our future as a first-class country is at stake in the race
to develop technologies such as HDTV.3 °
As recent trade reviews indicate,3 1 a broad spectrum of groups interested in telecommunications have expressed concern with the regulatory
status quo. 32 These groups are unhappy with the restrictions placed on
their entry into CATV.3 3 Broadcasters, along with land mobile radio
operators, are also concerned about the possible reallocation of existing
spectrum assignments to accommodate HDTV.34 In the absence of definitive FCC action on HDTV, Congress has taken the initiative and held
28. See W. DIZARD, THE COMING INFORMATION AGE (3rd ed. 1989).
29. DONOW, ATV/HDTV. Evolution, Revolution, Or Both, in MANY ROADS HOME: THE
NEw ELECTRONIC PATHWAYS at 11-33 (1988).
30. Interview with M. Elkin, All Things Considered, Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast (Feb. 19,
1989).
31. Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING, Nov. 7, 1988, at 19. See also FCC Under Congressional Fire, BROADCASTING, Dec. 5, 1988, at 42.
32. This interest in new telecommunication technology extends even to the Department of
Defense, which hopes to use HDTV for aircraft citing systems, along with fiber optics and
semiconductor chips for missile guidance.
33. See generally Wirth, supra note 21.
34. Id. at 14.
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hearings on proposals to devote federal funds for defense and consumer
applications of television technology.3 5 It would seem that those who
determine domestic telecommunications policy recognize that a fresh approach is more than desirable-rather, it is essential. Clearly, the policy,
or non-policy, of the FCC has failed.
New technologies have provided an important stimulus to the
search for a comprehensive telecommunication policy process. However,
there are other stimuli at work as well. Paramount among them is the
failure of the existing decentralized regulation and policy process and the
intense politization that has accompanied it. The FCC and the NTIA,
however, are each pursuing the problem in a different way, and both have
done so without success.
The FCC's very charter 36 represented an attempt by politicians of
both parties, across legislative and executive branches of government, to
exert some on-going control over policymaking processes. A key element
of the FCC's structure was to limit its mission. At its inception, the FCC
was not to be given carte blanche authority to expand its jurisdiction and
areas of influence. Nowhere is the narrowness of the FCC's mission
more apparent than in section I of the 1934 Act, which states, in part:
"For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by radio and wire.. . ."3 Neither that section nor any of the
following sections made any mention of long-term planning functions for
the FCC-vague allusions to commerce notwithstanding. Section 303,
which outlines "General Powers of the Commission" vis-a-vis radio, focuses on such technical functions as station classification, frequency assignment, and terms for license suspension. a While section 303(g)
alludes to the study of "new uses for radio," express planning functions
are not mentioned.3 9
Congress intended the FCC to allocate and assign the spectrum. Its
mission, as its predecessor's had been, was to manage the spectrum. The
intended FCC was reactive-to respond to applications for licenses and
to police licensees who were awarded them. The FCC was not meant to
be a policy initiator, rather it was meant to be a manager operating
within the confines of its charter. It was never seen as a vehicle for longterm policy planning.
35. Aversa, HDTVSuggestions Pourin to Subcommittee, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 6,

1989, at 8.
36. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-615 (1982 & Supp. 1989)).
37. Id. at § 151.
38. Id. at § 303.
39. Id. at § 303(g).
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Reactive functions for the FCC are apparent in the area of offensive
speech, where the prior review of speech is forbidden,' while subsequent
penalties might be allowed. 4 ' As section 326 states, "no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication."'4 2 This would stem from a "social responsibility" conception of
broadcasting, which allows for government oversight while protecting
the widest possible range of speech. Unfortunately, as the following discussion will illustrate, the FCC has extended this hands-off approach to
spectrum planning matters. It is helpful now to consider jurisdictional
struggles contributing to FCC policy failure in spectrum planning. In
the absence of another regulatory body charged with a policymaking
function and in the face of rapidly expanding technology, the FCC
43
stepped in to resolve political issues such as the Fairness Doctrine,
contract issues such as indecency' and children's programming,4 5 and
"level playing field" issues such as "must-carry" and "local origination"
rules for cable.4 6 FCC attempts to address, by default, a policy task not
envisioned in its charter were hampered by built-in limitations and complicated by paralyzing political conflicts, including the FCC's dual allegiance to the executive and legislative branches. Congress intended itself
as the natural constituency for the FCC.4 7 Congress envisioned that its
control over the FCC could be maintained through oversight and
appropriations.48
Similarly, the executive branch had its own designs on the FCC's
allegiance. The President appointed all Commissioners as well as the
Chairman.4 9 The Office of Management and Budget established the
FCC's priorities, from staff to forms to legislative initiatives. Rightly or
wrongly, the executive branch viewed the FCC as a part of the administration's team and as an implementor of its policies.
40. Id. at § 326.
41. Id. at § 312.
42. Id. at § 326.
43. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 17, at 220.
44. New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur
Radio Licensee, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2726 (1987).
45. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. 1704
(1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 73).
46. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); New York State Commission on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47. See Congress Asserts Its Dominion over FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27.

48. Id.
49. POLITICS OF

BROADCAST REGULATION,

supra note 1,at 35.
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The history behind the creation of the FCC raises the question of
how any policymaking body can function effectively when it receives direction from two diametrically-opposed masters. As President Abraham
Lincoln noted, "[A] house divided against itself cannot stand."5 ° Recent
times have seen the results of such an approach in communications policy. For instance, for over a year, the FCC functioned with only sixty
percent of its authorized commissioners because Congress would not approve President Reagan's appointees. In addition, confirmation hearings
for the three new Bush appointees have provided a forum for congressional leaders to restate that FCC Commissioners are supposed to implement congressional policy. In the meantime, the FCC continues to put
its faith in marketplace determination and abandonment of scarcity as
rationales for its regulatory actions or inactions.5 1
In the realm of broadcast journalism, the FCC's market approach
can be best characterized by the Fairness Doctrine.52 Achieving an exalted position as the sine qua non for license renewal in 1974," 3 the
Fairness Doctrine has descended in eleven short years5 4 to a status of
outmoded archaic policy.55 This fall from grace is evidenced by the
FCC's elimination of the Doctrine in 1985. At that time, the FCC noted
that the Doctrine was neither a "necessary or appropriate means [in]
which to effectuate" the public interest in receiving "diverse and antagonistic sources of information." 5 6 While courts and other policymakers
played a role in those changes, regulatory inconsistency was exacerbated
50. U.S. Government Printing Office, UNITED STATES HISTORY: 1600-1987 82 (1987).
51. See R. Pepper, Through the Looking Glass, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper
#25 (1988).
52. The Fairness Doctrine required broadcast licensees (1) to devote a reasonable percentage of time to the coverage of public issues and (2) to cover those issues in a fair manner. The
Fairness Doctrine provided an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view.
See generally T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN and J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FIFrH ESTATE (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter THE FIFTrH ESTATE].
53. In re Handling Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standard of the Communication Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Fairness
Report].
54. See THE FIFTH ESTATE, supra note 52, at 59.
55. The Commission had promoted the exposure of varying views since its inception.
Forced access requirements in pursuit of that goal have been opposed by broadcasters for an
equal period of time.
56. See 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 17. In dropping the rules, the FCC noted the
demise of the scarcity rationale and stated that the public interest is "fully served by the multiplicity of voices in the marketplace today." In addition, the FCC noted that the doctrine
"actually inhibit[ed] the presentation of controversial issues," as broadcasters tended to shy
away from controversy fearing that a fairness complaint might be brought against them. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations concerning the General
Fairness Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985).
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by the lack of clear direction from the FCC.5 7 Had the FCC shown consistent support for the Fairness Doctrine, resulting court challenges may
have been less successful in light of congressional support for the
doctrine."'
The saga of AM stereo provides another case study in regulatory
inconsistency. When authorized in 1982,"9 the FCC refused to select any
of the four systems then available as a formal standard. Instead of specifying a standard, the Commission opted for a marketplace selection policy. Thus, the FCC's marketplace policy implementation method failed
to effectively meet the needs of the public or the needs of the AM broadcasters, who were hesitant to invest in a potentially incompatible system.
The resulting fact is that after six years, only ten percent of United
States AM stations have AM stereo.'
The final example is also perhaps the most fitting example of the
FCC's failure to develop and implement policy-the issue of comparative
renewal. This involves incumbent licensees and newcomers vying for the
same frequency. This process has resulted in the FCC heavily favoring
incumbents. 6 Although the FCC has undertaken sporadic initiatives to
reform comparative renewal, such measures have proven ineffective and
unpopular.62 The renewal case of Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v.
FCC sums up the general frustration succinctly: "We suspect that somewhere, sometime, somehow, some television licensee should fail in a comparative renewal challenge, but the FCC has never discovered such a
licensee yet."' 63 FCC review of station licenses has become something of
a rubber stamp for licensees. Less than one year after Central Florida,
the D.C. Circuit vacated an FCC action to deny renewal in Geller v.
FCC,' terming the action "another meandering effort by the FCC to
develop a paradigm for its license renewal hearings." 65 The courts have
thus expressed concern with matters of rigor, as well as matters of consistency, in the FCC's oversight of the comparative renewal process.
57. Where Things Stand, supra note 31. See also FCC Under CongressionalFire, supra
note 31.

58. See FCC Under CongressionalFire, supra note 31.
59. In re AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1982). Some six
years later, while revisiting the matter, the FCC would still not make a selection, reaffirming
its policy of marketplace determination. See In re AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 64 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 516 (1988).
60. THE FIFTH ESTATE, supra note 52, at 53.
61. Id. at 111.
62. See Where Things Stand, supra note 31. The matter is also a significant policy issue
discussed in NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 26, at 499.
63. Central Florida Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
64. 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 84.
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These examples are but a few of those found in a fifty-five year record of vacillation, hesitation, and procrastination accorded the FCC.
While the root of these problems lies with a lack of coordination among
all branches of government, the problems could have been lessened by
clearly-defined FCC action. Instead, it appears that policy has been replaced by paralysis at the FCC. This paralysis even extends to the
method of choosing commissioners; through its revised charter of sitting
members, the FCC has operated with as few as three Commissioners
since the mid-1980s. 66 Continuing struggles over appointments to vacant
seats on the Commission have only intensified the malaise. Moreover the
resignations of all three sitting Commissioners in 1989 left a mounting
policy agenda of "lame ducks" for most of that year.
The responses of Congress and of the courts has exposed the void
created by the FCC's approach. Congress has found it necessary to become the "Court of Appeals" for the FCC.67 Forced to assume the role
of the Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, Congress, in 1988, addressed
initiatives in such specific areas as indecency,68 children's television,6 9
and the Fairness Doctrine.7 °
Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Earnest Hollings (D-S.C.)
has characterized the FCC as an agency run by "youngsters" who function with a "non-policy." 7 1 Furthermore, Hollings has stated that a new
FCC and a new chairman would lead to establishing policy.7 2 While
Senator Hollings is right about the non-policy approach of the FCC, it is
difficult to see how, after past experiences with the FCC, more of the
same would produce a different result.
The courts, long deferential to the FCC's purported expertise, have
now ceased to function as "knee-jerk" ratifiers of FCC policy. A telling
example is the dismissal of the must-carry rules by the U.S. Court of
3
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Century Communications Corp. v. FCC."
Here, Chief Judge Wald rejected a plea by the FCC to uphold new must66. The deregulation reduction of FCC Commissioners from seven to five did not solve
the problem. See THE FIFTH ESTATE, supra note 52, at 33. As communications policy conflicts between Congress and the White House intensified in the second Reagan administration,
Congress refused to confirm Reagan nominees to the FCC. Wing, Closing in on a New FCC,
BROADCASTING, June 19, 1989, at 27. The result was that the FCC operated with only three
of the authorized five Commissioners for an extended period of time. No policy question could
get proper or timely attention in such a climate.
67. See Where Things Stand, supra note 31.
68. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-605 (1988).
69. H.R. 3288, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
70. 102 F.C.C.2d 1401 (1988).
71. FCC Under CongressionalFire, supra note 31.

72. Id.
73. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
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carry rules based on the FCC's "sound predictive judgment." 74 This
court rejected the mystique of "expertise" in favor of empirical support
or, alternately, "sound reasoning." 7 5
If this ruling is an indication of recent judicial sentiment, it seems
the courts, like Congress, are clearly frustrated with the FCC's policymaking process. It appears that the FCC, as a governmental agency, was
fatally flawed from its inception. To stand the test of judicial scrutiny,
future communications policy will require more than its pronouncement
by the "expert" FCC.
Even the communications industry, which should be delighted with
the FCC's marketplace orientation, has misgivings. FCC initiatives on
everything from new service licensing to upgrades have prompted the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) to ask the FCC to consider
what it is doing.7 6 As to citizens' groups, one merely has to take notice
of their regular opposition to the current status of such issues as children's TV and cable regulation.7 7
Of course, issues such as these often involve mutually exclusive interests, and makes a consensus in the policymaking process an elusive
end product. All, however, could benefit from more carefully coordinated policymaking. It is in this climate that a national communications
policy must emerge, and it must emerge soon. What is that policy to be,
and what role is to be played by existing and new technologies? To develop individual policies, one must identify the role of each in the overall
spectrum utilization and further determine the role that CATV is to play.
There are also other continuing problems with such non-endangered species as FM radio and VHF television. How will the federal government
oversee the entry of telephone companies and emerging technologies
78
such as HDTV into the Fifth Estate?
74. Must-carry rules required cable operators to carry the signal of any local television
station or to carry a significantly viewed station that requested carriage. The original rules
were vacated in Quincy Cable TV Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A scaled-

down version of those rules was again vacated in Century Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 835
F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

75. See Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 304.
76. NAB Shies from a Crowded Marketplace, BROADCASTING, July 4, 1988, at 47.

77. An example of citizen's group opposition to FCC policies with children's programming may be seen in the unsuccessful attempt by Action for Children's Television to force the
FCC to require electronic signals at the beginning of advertisements aimed at children. In the
Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to a Children's Advertising Detector Signal, 100 F.C.C.2d

163 (1985). More recently, citizen's groups have opposed the FCC's imposition of syndicated
exclusivity rules in cable, which will result in periodic program blackouts. See Non-Dupe Fracas Hits TCI System, CABLE WORLD, Nov. 27, 1989, at 3.
78. Aversa, Broadcasters Want FCC HDTV Task Force, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 30,
1989, at 42.
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While some might argue that a laissez faire approach promotes maximum creativity, 9 ad-hoc decision making by a part-time political commission has contributed to several of the problems broadcasters
experience today. In light of intensified competition from abroad, the
time has come to consider alternatives involving industry and government cooperation in the formulation and execution of a telecommunications policy.
II
A Policy Proposal
Having reviewed the salient shortcomings of FCC regulation, it is
appropriate to outline an alternative regulatory model. Such a model
should maintain and enforce existing public interest rationales as a justification for government regulation. As recent events indicate, abandoning
regulation in favor of market forces does not necessarily insure that the
public interest is protected. Additionally, the abandonment of regulation
is not in the general interest of market players. This approach might
work if all industry interests were, in fact, playing on a level field. However, until that field is leveled, the market force concept is premature at
best.
A.

Evaluative Criteria

In evaluating alternative models for communications regulation, the
focus will be limited to a few key areas, beginning with administrative
feasibility. Simply put, this refers to the ease with which a policy can be
implemented in terms of cost, manpower and supervisory resources.
However, if a policy is to be adopted, it must attain a critical measure of
politicalfeasibility. As a practical matter, this would require that a policy initiative gain both congressional and executive level support. In addition, legalfeasibility is necessary. This refers to the degree in which a
policy is consistent with the Constitution and the tradition of communications regulation. Finally, social desirability, or the degree to which a
given initiative promotes the public interest, is required.
At the dawn of a new decade and of a new administration, it is
important to reconsider the fundamental aspects of spectrum management. Before allocating the spectrum any further, a freeze should be applied until a profile of industry health can be made. Because the FCC, by
its very nature, has been unable to address problems with a long-term
perspective, an entirely new approach is needed. Thus, rather than
79. See, e.g., Radio and Television News Directors Association, supra note 14.
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amend the Communications Act of 1934, the time has come to abandon
it.
Such a departure in policy may, in some ways, echo earlier calls
made during the 1970s.10 Many of those early proposals were reformoriented"' and were ultimately incorporated into the Cable Communication Act of 1984.82 In a more sweeping proposal, 3 the Communications
Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee examined avenues for regulatory reform, including a Cabinet-level
Department of Telecommunications.1 4 The instant proposal takes the
Communications subcommittee's proposal one step further, by urging a
consolidation of all communications agencies under a single Cabinetlevel Department. Specifically, we are calling for the abolition of the
FCC and the NTIA in favor of a Cabinet-level Department of
Communications.
By doing this, the government would make communications a coordinated national priority, with adequate funding to employ experts and a
professional staff capable of designing and implementing long-term strategies for the evolving telecommunications marketplace. This proposal
may sound radical in light of the long-standing relationship between the
regulators and the regulated. Such a proposal, however, is not entirely
without precedent. When similar technological advances clouded the
1909 Copyright Act," the Act was reformed to better reflect those technological advances.8 6 Thus, a sweeping change in technology motivated
an equally striking legislative response, a response that has proven more
serviceable than a series of legislative band aids. Certainly, the challenges presented by increased global competition in the communications
industry are no less important than those forces which prompted the
copyright debates of the 1970s. An equally decisive move should be
made in writing a comprehensive communications policy for the new
technologies, as an alternative to the status quo of piecemeal regulation.
Similar mechanisms to the one proposed above are in place in Japan,
where national postal and telegraph authorities take an active role in
planning and protecting telecommunication technologies.8 7 By raising
80. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, OPTIONS PAPERS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter OPTIONS PAPERS REPORT].

81. Id. at 617.
82. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-605 (1988).
83. OPTIONS PAPERS REPORT, SUPRA note 80, at 617.
84. Id. at 623.
85. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)).
86. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
87. R. AKHAVAN-MAJID, Telecommunications Policy-Making in Japan: the 1980s and
Beyond, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (in press).
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communications policy to the Cabinet level, the United States could better accommodate foreign competition and further safeguard its large
stake in the evolving information marketplace. A case in point is HDTV.
This new technology has implications for the national defense, the trade
deficit, and bilateral relations with some of the United States' most important trading partners, not to mention U.S. consumers and workers.
Because of these implications, it is critical that policy on HDTV be made
by a Cabinet-level Department of Communications. Only such a department will have the resources and influence required to successfully implement the most appropriate policy.
In addition to economic efficiencies, a Cabinet-level department
would be less prone to political exigencies. Although administrative
agencies were designed to be a step removed from the political process,
the personnel problems mentioned earlier suggest that this structure has
not succeeded, at least with respect to the FCC. Administrative instability may be traced, in large measure, to recurring vacancies on the Commission. Due to the nature of the FCC's structure, these vacancies tend
to exist for extended periods of time. It is imperative that a more stable
base of executive officers be maintained and that they be sheltered from
the recurring jurisdictional fights between the executive and legislative
branches. Constant bickering between branches has never been conducive to the formulation of policy in this or any other area. A Secretary of
Communications appointed by the President would enable the policy
making body and the regulatory body to function as a cohesive unit at all
times. Such a change would not alter existing political power bases. The
party in power would control three of five existing seats on the Commission. Senate input would lie in the confirmation process, as it has with
other departments. In this case, the Secretary would be subject to congressional approval and would be required to appear before congressional
committees on a routine basis. The goal best satisfied by this change
would be administrative feasibility in planning, coordination, and
accountability.
This structure would help eliminate the earlier noted deficiencies in
the mission statement and in the politics that now plague the FCC. As a
Cabinet-level component of the Executive Branch, the Department
would carry a broadly worded mandate elevating the problem of stepping
outside the scope of its authority. The Department's direction would be
provided by the Secretary, who would be appointed by the President.
Congress would continue to have input through its constitutional responsibility to approve appointments and through its approprations role.
Gone would be the days of dual policy directions and paralysis resulting
from staggered terms of commissioners. The ever-present political in-
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fighting attributable to Republican and Democratic Commissioners advocating their own positions or constituent interests would also be
eliminated.
Even if one were to assume that the White House administration
would change hands every four years, the proposed Department would
be more stable than the present FCC. The existing process provides for a
chairman to be appointed by the President, yet it has the disadvantage of
constant turnover among the commissioners, owing to staggered terms of
office and the inaction that stems from unconfirmed appointments. With
a Secretary of Communications, even one replaced with every election,
vacancies and policy voids would be no greater than those affecting other
departments.
One basic political reality would remain unchanged: the Secretary
of Communications would be a majority of one, as is presently the case in
the FCC. Hence, the separation of powers will be maintained, but
debilitating aspects of the current structure are eliminated. That is, by
consolidating executive planning functions under a Cabinet-level department with enhanced powers, areas of overlap (and contention) with Congress would be eliminated. Turnovers among officers should also
decrease.
While all of the telecommunications components across the government would be combined in the new Department, two main divisions
would still exist-the regulatory arm (formerly the FCC) and the policy
arm (formerly the NTIA). There is, in fact, precedent for combining
quasi-judicial functions and policy functions into an executive department. One recent example is the consolidation of the Federal Power
Commission and the Federal Energy Administration, which were combined to form the Department of Energy."8 To date, there have been no
constitutional challenges to this consolidation based upon the doctrine of
separation of powers, and no such challenges should result from this proposed combination.
In accord with this precedent, the regulatory functions of the FCC
would be transferred to an independent body within the Department.
This newly-formed body would be known as the Federal Communications Regulatory Commission (FCRC). The FCRC would consist of five
commissioners, each serving a four-year term. Members of the FCRC
would be appointed by the President, but subject to confirmation by the
Senate. The President would also designate one of the five commissioners as the chairperson. No more than three of the five commissioners
could be from the same political party as the President. The FCRC
88. Department of Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (1988).
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would license new facilities, approve renewal applications, and administer the policies established by the Department of Communications. The
regulatory arm of the Department of Communications would perform
the "traffic-cop" tasks originally intended for the FCC.
By elevating the communications policy in this manner, this approach would not differ from the approaches recently taken in energy
and veterans' affairs. A national communications policy is at least as
vital, and should receive the same high level of attention. As illustrated
by the recent formulation of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, 89 a
great deal of efficiency could be purchased at minimum cost (e.g., no new
building would be necessary, given the FCC's existing physical plant).
Even if unforeseen costs should render the proposed Department approach more expensive than the present system, long-term efficiencies accompanying centralized planning should generate long-term savings as
has occurred with the FCRC. Thus, inasmuch as political feasibility
hinges on the question of cost, this proposal is likely to succeed. More
importantly, perhaps, there is precedent for the proposed Department, as
well as the need and opportunity to establish one. It is important, then,
to explore exactly who might benefit and who might suffer under a Department of Communications.
B. Discussion and Analysis
The history of broadcast regulation indicates that the key determinants of public policy in this realm include governmental bodies-such
as the FCC, the courts, Congress, and the White House-as well as industry representatives and citizens' action groups.90 Successful policy
making results from coalitions among these groups, as no single entity
dominates the regulatory process. Past work has, for example, applied
this model to the regulation of children's advertising9 1 and children's
programming. 92 In both cases, neither Action for Children's Television
(ACT) coalitions with the Commission during the 1970s nor with Congress during the 1980s had been sufficient to enact policy changes.
Rather, broadcasters dominated the process by effectively lobbying the
FCC, the executive branch, and the courts to accept their deregulatory
rationale.
89. 38 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
90. See POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, supra note 1, at 33.
91. Tucker & Safelle, The Federal Communications Commission and the Regulation of
Children's Television, 26 J. BROADCASTING 657 (1982).
92. Atkin & Lin, Children's ProgrammingReconsidered, 10 COMM. & L., 3 (1988).
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1. The Courts
The legal feasibility of an initiative such as this is dependent on the
propriety of past FCC bases for legislation. As previously mentioned,
the courts have generally recognized the public service rationale as a
statutory standard since 1943. 9' Spectrum scarcity is, however, quite a
different matter. It has been generally recognized that criticism of scarcity94 abated when the Fairness Doctrine was abandoned. In a similar
vein, the Commission's 1985 FairnessReport states:
[W]e simply believe that, in analyzing the appropriate First Amendment standard to be applied to the electronic press, the concept of scarcity-be it spectrum or numerical-is irrelevant .... [A]n evaluation
of First Amendment standards should not focus on the physical differences between the electronic press and the printed press, but on the
functional similarities between these two media and upon the underlying values and goals of the First Amendment. We believe that the
function of the electronic press in a free society is identical to that of
the printed press and that, therefore, the constitutional
analysis of gov95
ernment control of content should be no different.
Delegation of congressional power to an "expert" body, with the
power to make policy and to regulate, premised upon the "public interest," has long been recognized as valid by the courts.9 6 Indeed, it will
make little difference if the repository of this authority becomes an executive department instead of an executive agency. Within the proper
framework, there is not one predictable judicial objection to the establishment of a Department of Communications. As noted in the 1974
FairnessReport, which was upheld by the courts, the concept that government merely need adopt a laissez faire attitude toward competing interests has never been accepted in broadcasting.9 7 In fact, with the
scarcity-based rationale gone as a basis for electronic media regulation,
the need for a complete review of communications leading to a national
policy is now more important than ever.
Despite the erosion of the scarcity as a rationale for regulation, the
courts would likely support a Cabinet-level department based on public
interest grounds. Although Red Lion9 8 has been partially compromised
with the elimination of rules such as the Fairness Doctrine, public interest rationales have not yet faced any serious legal challenges.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
1985 FairnessReport, supra note 17.
Id. at 221-25.
See supra note 3.
1974 Fairness Report, supra note 53, at 3.
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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2. Citizens' Groups
A wide range of citizens' groups have influenced government policy.
They range from Action for Children's Television (ACT) to Accuracy in
Media (AIM). National groups such as these are complemented by local
media access organizations. These groups can be distinguished by the
following traits: 1) a lower capital base; 2) non-mainstream cultural orientation; and 3) a greater dependency on, or interest in, local programming.99 Thus, local groups typically represent a non-traditional
broadcast orientation. In general, these citizens' groups have been on the
defensive in recent years. For example, despite NAB support for the
measure, in 1988 President Reagan vetoed an ACT-supported bill to
limit commercial content during children's programming." ° Additionally, AIM, a long-time supporter of the Fairness Doctrine, was dealt a
blow when the Doctrine was vacated. In the area of cable television, the
National League of Cities (NLC) lost its bid to regulate basic rates in the
1984 Cable Communication Policy Act. As a consequence, the NLC is
so disturbed by rising cable rates that it now supports legislation which
will allow telephone company ownership of cable systems.10 It would be
helpful if the NLC could present the arguments to a responsive executive
branch department.
These are but a few of the recent setbacks that have reinforced the
concern of various citizens' groups that they lack the money and ex parte
contacts necessary to lobby the FCC. As has been noted in the area of
access, "Although the public possesses a paramount right of access to
information in the electronic forum .... [a]ccess rights [arose] only upon
the presentation of a controversial view on an issue of public importance,
broadcast of a personal attack, or appearance of a legally qualified
candidate."'
In the debate over scarcity, access proponents argue that, despite
increases in actual media outlet numbers, the diversity of ideas which
they promote has not increased appreciably. If anything, recent changes
in multiple ownership rules, the relaxation of duopoly rules,'0 3 and the
permissibility of corporate mergers have probably increased viewpoint
scarcity and ownership access. Access has decreased despite increases in
99. B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, BROADCAST ECONOMICS 111 (1974).
100. See Where Things Stand, supra note 31.
101. Van Lewen, Cable Bill Extravaganza, CABLE TELEVISION Bus., July 1, 1989, at 12,
13.
102. Lively, Media Access and a Free Press: Pursuing First Amendment Values Without
Imperiling First Amendment Rights, 58 DEN. L.J. 17 (1980).
103. The multiple ownership and duopoly rules, which place limits on the number of AM,
FM and TV outlets a single entity can own, were replaced to allow for a greater concentration
of station ownership (i.e., permitting greater broadcast-newspaper cross-ownership).
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the number of media modalities. Access groups contend that the relative
scarcity of channels, which justifies government regulation, is even more
pervasive now than when only one-tenth as many stations were
available. IoI
Such groups, no doubt, support the Red Lion contention that a
broadcaster's need for self-expression is defeated by limiting license availability to the few, thus creating a prolonged oligopoly of powerful speakers.1 5 Though quantitative access to this oligopoly may have been
widened somewhat through technological advancements, barriers to access still limit media involvement to a relatively small portion of society.
For most, freedom of the press is a guarantee only for those who can
afford it.' °6 Citizens' groups will undoubtedly welcome an accountable
executive department to which they can voice their concerns, even if they
do not always prevail.
3. The FCC
It is perhaps easiest to forecast the FCC's likely response to a Department of Communications--outright opposition. As Erwin G. Krasnow and others note, the FCC is "more than just an independent
regulatory commission wrestling with the problem of its political
nonindependence; it is also a bureaucracy."'' 0 7 Just as governments
would not be expected to vote themselves out of existence, the FCC cannot be expected to greet its demise with open arms. As former FCC
Commissioner Lee Loevinger states, "[T]he first step towards a realistic
understanding of bureaucratic decision making is a recognition that the
power motive is to bureaucracy what the profit motive is to business."1 8
Even so, apprehensive staffers might be persuaded to support the
Cabinet concept if they could be assured a spot in the new department.
Their status would certainly be elevated to that of the FCC.
4. The Congress
As with any representative body, we could expect a wide range of
opinions on the matter of establishing a new executive department. As
mentioned earlier, the cable television industry would likely oppose this
move. We might, therefore, expect that "cable-oriented" senators, such
as Timothy Wirth (D-Colo.), would also oppose the formation of a new
104.

Friedland, FCC Clears The Way For Low-Power TV, CLEARING THE AIR, May 1981,

at 1.
105. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

106. A.

LIEHLING, THE PRESS IN AMERICA

(1974).

107. POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, supra note 1, at 35.

108. Id. at 37.
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executive department. Several of these congressmen, however, are also
aligned with the agendas of various citizens' groups. For example, Senator Wirth supports ACT." 9 In a clash between these two factions, representatives would probably favor the citizens' groups.
On the other hand, representatives from the broadcasting industry,
such as the NAB and the INTV, as well as representatives from other
citizens' groups would undoubtedly lobby their champions to back such
a proposal. Additionally, one variable might lie in solution-oriented activists such as Senator Earnest Hollings (D-S.C.), who has consistently
voiced his concerns over the non-policy bent of the FCC.110 Hollings is a
recognized leader on communications matters, as indicated by his support of the Fairness Doctrine, transfer taxes, and other issues faced in the
broadcasting industry."1 ' His support on communications matters could
prove to be pivotal to the success or failure of the proposed policy.
The structural orientation of this proposal is also likely to appeal to
the regulation-oriented Democrats who control both congressional
houses. Such a proposal should also appeal to moderate Republicans. In
fact, it is the moderate Republicans who are most likely to be Bush's
congressional leaders, much as the conservative Republicans were Reagan's leaders.
5.

The White House

In the 1980 election, President Reagan promised to eliminate two
Cabinet-level departments, Energy and Education. Not only did Reagan
fail to eliminate these two departments, he ended up creating a new one,
the Department of Veteran's Affairs. Additionally, a Cabinet-level
"Drug Czar" was contemplated.1 12 While the motivation for these
moves may have been political, the fact remains that over the years the
White House has been receptive to a consolidation of power and responsibilities to address perceived national problems.
The present proposal for a Department of Communications would
become a consideration for the Bush administration. The degree of presidential involvement in telecommunications issues has varied with the office holder. Attitudes have ranged from "activist," as illustrated by the
109. See Weekday Programs For Children: ACT Study Keeps Record, BROADCASTING,
Sept. 9, 1982, at 52.

110. For example, Hollings voiced concern over the FCC's elimination of anti-trafficking
regulations. See FCC Under CongressionalFire, supra note 31, at 10.
111. See Where Things Stand, supra note 31, at 10. See also FCC Under CongressionalFire,
supra note 31, at 10.
112. Reagan's contemplation became Bush's reality. In 1988, President Bush appointed
William Bennett as his Drug Czar.
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Johnson years, to "disinterested," as best evidenced by President Reagan's administration.
What is to be expected from President Bush? Nothing in his record
indicates a particular interest in telecommunications. Early signs indicate, however, that he will take more of an activist role than did his
predecessor.1 3 Bush seems to be predisposed to deal with neglected issues such as education, the budget deficit, and daycare. The President
also seems intent upon reestablishing a working relationship with
Congress.
Therefore, the climate may favor support for this proposal from the
new administration, with the prospects improving should there be any
indication of congressional interest. At the present time, however, we
should expect a "wait and see" attitude from the Bush administration.
At the very least, outright opposition to this proposal is highly unlikely.
6. Industry
The broadcasting industry of today is not the monolithic entity
which existed when the FCC was born in 1934. The NAB would appear
to be the voice for marketplace determination, perhaps, as it was in 1981
when the ecstacy of deregulation swept the country. It may be that the
NAB is the first segment of the industry "to sober up after the party."
Unbridled enthusiasm at the NAB has faded, giving way to more measured counter-proposals." 4 The NAB demonstrated caution in an early
summer report, 15 questioning whether the new services planned by the
FCC were in the public interest, and whether more service really meant
better service. The FCC plan to increase the power of all Class A FM
licenses from 3kw to 6kw was greeted by a more-limited NAB counterproposal." 6 This NAB proposal wants planning and well-reasoned policies, which, from the recent reaction to it, one might infer it is not getting. Thus industry support might follow for abolishing the very FCC
which, according to some critics, is in the industry's hip pocket." 7
Where NAB support is questionable, support will likely come from
the specialized trade organizations that arose to protect the interests disadvantaged by FCC action or inaction. Such a list would certainly have
to include the INTV, the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters,
the National Radio Broadcasters Association, and the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, all of which represent specialized
113. Sperling, Bush After Six Months, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 1, 1989, at 18.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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Starr, supra note 27, at 20.
FCC Under CongressionalFire, supra note 31.
THE FIFTH ESTATE, supra note 52, at 53.
B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, supra note 99, at 111.
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broadcast ownership constituencies. To this list newer offshoots must be
added, such as home dish and satellite master antenna retailers. Both of
these groups have been hurt by discriminatory pricing by cable program
distributors.
Apart from the broadcast industry, support might also be expected
from telephone companies, or telcos, hoping to achieve entry into new
service areas such as CATV. Telcos could even form a coalition with
cities, who seem anxious to punish multiple system operators for cable
price increases of over 100% that have followed deregulation under the
Cable Communications Act of 1984.118 In fact, Congress will be debating the merits of telco-delivered programming during the 1989 and 1990
sessions. 119
For those same reasons, the cable industry will undoubtedly be apprehensive about any changes in the communications policy. They might
well oppose this proposal on the theory that any new structure which
could result in a review of the cable industry's status is to be viewed with
suspicion. This is especially true in light of the fact that the NCTA and
multiple system operators were both big winners after the passage of the
Cable Telecommunication Act of 1984. In addition to the elimination of
rate regulation, cable lobbyists succeeded in codifying regulatory barriers
to broadcast and telecommuncication entry into cable. In short, this segment of the industry has the most to gain by perpetuating the status quo.
On balance, the critical mass of Fifth Estate interests would undoubtedly welcome the change to a Cabinet-level department. Such a
department would signify that a higher priority be placed on telecommunications policy, with a resulting qualitative improvement in policy
development.
III
Conclusion
In sum, one can anticipate that a coalition made up of Congress,
selected industry groups, the courts and various citizens' groups could
effect the implementation of a Cabinet-level department. These groups
would likely prevail over the FCC, the most powerful source of opposition to the proposed change. The wider consensus should emerge despite
the antagonistic relationship of certain groups within the coalition (e.g.,
between citizens' groups and broadcasters), because all might benefit
from coordinated planning. While the executive branch may not be a
natural constituency favoring such regulation, President Bush may ex118. See Van Lewen, supra note 101, at 12.
119. Id.
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ploit this opportunity to seek rapprochement with a Democratic Congress. Both branches now realize that all interests could be better served
by a body that is less ideological and more pragmatic than the FCC was
under the Reagan administration.
Of course, a Department of Communications is not a panacea for all
communication policy problems. As events of the past two decades suggest, consistent policy cannot emerge from the sporadic decisions of uncoordinated federal agencies. We have suggested a rather extreme
solution to this problem--eliminating the FCC and the NTIA in favor of
a Cabinet-level Department of Communications. This proposal is based
on the realization that committees and commissions complicate the policymaking process. Long-term planning by consensus is never wise. As
other countries attempt to close their "technology gaps" with the United
States, the United States itself continues to deal with the pieces of the
puzzle without any idea of what the assembled puzzle ought to look like.
As AT&T's Robert Allen notes, "America is writing the story of the 21 st
century" with its telecommunication industries, however this lead is now
being threatened by coordinated, subsidized foreign competitors; "regulatory sense and legal sense do not hive to be at odds with common
sense. '12 In short, the situation is crying out for action. Both the industry and the public must petition Congress and President Bush to review
telecommunication regulations as a priority matter.

120. Robert Allen, Comments on the US Information Industry, Cable Senate Public Affairs Network broadcast (Feb. 18, 1989).

